

Sent: Tue, 10 May 2011 08:04:25 -0400
From: indiausdialogue@yahoogroups.com
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Subject: [INDIA-US-DIALOGUE] Digest Number 617

INDIA-US-DIALOGUE

Messages In This Digest (6 Messages)

1.
[High Noon in Pakistan](#) From: Reggie Sinha
2.
[America's Finest Hour](#) From: Reggie Sinha
3.
[CIA and ISI, once joined at the hip, now daggers drawn by](#) Chidanand From: n m
4.
[HAL GOULD'S CORNER -- FACING THE TRUTH ABOUT PAKISTAN](#) From: Harold
5.
[It's smart diplomacy by](#) Rohit Viswanath From: n m
6.
[26/11 attack is as important to US as 9/11: Timothy Roemer](#) From: n m

[View All Topics](#) | [Create New Topic](#)

Messages

1.
[High Noon in Pakistan](#)

Posted by: "Reggie Sinha" [REDACTED]
Mon May 9, 2011 6:19 pm (PDT)

- - P6/b(6)

I liked these suggestions in response to the excellent article by Professor Mead reproduced below.

A few disagreements/suggestions in an otherwise great summary of the U.S.- Pakistan relations. First, Saudi Arabia as a source for stabilizing Pakistan. Saudi money/clergy is much to blame for the salafi influence and wahabbiization of South Asian muslims, including Pakistanis, over the past two decades. More Saudi influence means more "literal" interpretive Islam foisted amongst its followers in South Asia, an extremely risky alternative. Second, Pakistan perfidy is nothing but Punjabi perfidy. Cauterize Punjabi Pakistanis, and you have largely contained the disease. Third, when Pakistan seeks "strategic depth" in Afghanistan, western policy makers incorrectly interpret it as against India. The Afghanis/Pashtus (and Taliban) do not recognize the Durand Line, which lapsed in 1993. It is this fear of Pashtuns reclaiming their ancestral land currently illegally occupied by Pakistan which drives Pakistan to seek complete dominance over Afghanistan. The Afghanistan/Pashtus should be allowed to reclaim their Pashtun land from what Pakistan calls the "lawless frontier." This "taliban" violence can largely be controlled if Pakhtunistan is created restoring peace in South Asia. Next, Americans must ALWAYS maintain a

presence in AfPak region, lest a Saudi-Pak-China axis shuts them out forever. The good professor has written about the restive Baluchistan, a state forcibly annexed by Pakistan in its initial formative years. An American-friendly, independent state of Baluchistan astriding between the Middle East, Central, South Asia AND the Indian ocean will ensure USA's engagement in the region. Lastly, the pusillimous Indians must be kicked out of their lethargy and forced to assert themselves in stabilizing the region. Peace!

<http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/wrm/2011/05/08/high-noon-in-pakistan/> (posting in full with due acknowledgement to Professor Mead's blog site)

High Noon in Pakistan

Walter Russell Mead

The taking of Osama was a defeat for Al Qaeda. It was a disaster for Pakistan. The Assassination in Abbottabad was a strategic catastrophe for the military rulers of this slowly and painfully failing state. On the one hand, it leaves the reputation of Pakistan as an effective partner against fanatical terror groups in ruins. The debate in Washington and around the world now is whether the Pakistani state is in league with Al Qaeda or whether it is so weak, divided and incompetent that rogue factions within the state have escaped all control. The rich intelligence haul the US gathered in Osama's lair will help the US learn more about Osama's protectors in Pakistan; in the meantime it is transparently clear that whether incompetence or malfeasance is more to blame, the government of Pakistan cannot safely be trusted — by anyone, on anything.

The argument for a continued US-Pakistani alliance took a body blow. If Pakistan can't or won't help us with the capture of Osama bin Laden, what possible justification does the alliance have? Arguably, the two people who have done the greatest damage to American interests in the last twenty years have been A. Q. Khan, ringmaster of the nuclear proliferation circus that helped countries like North Korea, Libya, Syria and Iran advance their nuclear ambitions, and Osama bin Laden. What country produced one and sheltered both?

From the ISI/military point of view, trust is not just a problem when it comes to relations with the US. The Pakistani military has to have foreign patrons; without foreign aid it cannot pretend even to itself to be a serious competitor to India. India is too big, and Pakistan is too small, too unstable, too divided by bitter internal fault lines, too poorly developed and too incompetently governed to hold its own without outside help.

As US-Pakistan tensions rise, the Pakistanis have looked to China as an alternative great power backer. The Pakistani argument to China is that Pakistan offers an offset to India that makes it harder for India to challenge Chinese influence in southeast Asia and elsewhere. Pakistan can also offer China friendly ports close to the vital oilfields of the Middle East and also a useful land route for trade and power projection.

This is not an unattractive proposition, and China is already in business with Pakistan, providing foreign aid and promoting growth in bilateral trade. The value of China's aid to Pakistan is hard to estimate, but trade between the two countries is worth about \$8.7 billion. (US military and economic aid to Pakistan

last year totaled almost \$4.5 billion and US-Pakistani trade was worth \$1.6 billion.) Additionally, China provides material and financial assistance for Pakistan's nuclear program; during a visit to Pakistan in December 2010, Wen Jiabao and Pakistani officials finalized plans for the construction of a one gigawatt nuclear reactor in Chashma, making it the third and largest reactor in Pakistan. China's agreement to provide nuclear materials to Pakistan despite Pakistan's nuclear program and poor record on proliferation was seen in Pakistan and elsewhere as a counter to the US-India agreement.

But for the Chinese, who have so far flirted with Pakistan but never come close to giving the Pakistanis the support they desperately crave, there are three very big catches. First, Pakistan looks as bent on self-destruction to China as it does to everyone else in the world; why put your money on a such a weak horse?

Second, if China becomes the partner of Pakistan's dreams, it wrecks its relationship with India and drives India into America's arms. A closer relationship with Pakistan might be necessary for China in the event that the US and India developed a tight alliance aimed against China, but China's best strategy now is to prevent the US-India relationship from turning into an anti-China alliance. Flirting with Pakistan makes sense as a way to keep both Washington and Delhi on their toes, but anything more would be a costly mistake.

And third, there are the same questions of competence and trust that give Washington pause. Can Pakistan really be trusted on the subject of 'Islamic' terror? The Pakistani defense establishment is totally fixated on maintaining links with terror groups and radical groups to advance its interests in both Afghanistan and India. China doesn't like this very much; none of the great powers with interests in Central Asia have much sympathy for Pakistan's desire to strengthen radical Sunni groups. But if Pakistan showed that it was willing and able to use this weapon selectively — to tolerate and even promote terror groups aimed at India while cracking down ruthlessly and effectively on any Muslims crazy enough to dream of fighting for their co-religionists in western China — then maybe, just maybe, Pakistan and China could cut a deal.

But the Abbottabad imbroglio calls Pakistan's good faith and its ability into question. Will Islamabad really suppress, murder and betray Uighur Muslims who want to bring jihad to their homeland, or will Pakistani weakness, incompetence, religious fanaticism and/or corruption mean that Pakistan will provide sanctuary and perhaps more to China's deadly enemies even as it takes China's cash? On the evidence of Abbottabad, few Chinese foreign policy analysts will propose trusting Pakistan. Nice words, candy and flowers on its birthday, but little else.

The attack on Abbottabad was not just a blow to Al Qaeda; it was a direct blow to the heart of Pakistani self confidence. Pakistan puts a lot of faith in its nuclear bombs. ISI types in Pakistan believe that US mistrust of Pakistan is so deep that the US is looking for an opportunity to take control of the Pakistani nuclear arsenal.

The strong likelihood that somebody powerful in Pakistan was helping Osama makes the (far fetched) scenario of an American nuclear snatch more frightening to Pakistan. If the US concludes that Pakistan is a state sponsor of terror with close links to Al Qaeda with nuclear weapons and a long record of bad behavior on proliferation issues, the desire to separate those weapons from unworthy hands could

become very strong. The Abbottabad raid demonstrates two things that have shocked the Pakistani security establishment to the core: that the US in pursuit of supreme national interests is willing to send military forces into the heart of Pakistan's territory and security zone — and that we have the capacity to do so at will. A. Q. Khan may be sleeping a little less soundly and may well have moved all his thumb drives to a more secure location.

India, of course watched the raid closely. India, a victim in the past of Pakistan-supported terrorist violence, has the same concerns about Pakistani nukes and terror groups that Washington does. After observing the mysteriously powerful Stuxnet computer worm in neighboring Iran, and now shocked by American ability to move forces at will, the Pakistani security establishment is now coming to terms with some profoundly unsettling realities. Already, Pakistani Foreign Secretary Salman Bashir has warned India off an Abbottabad-style raid aimed at the accused perpetrators of the 2008 Mumbai attacks.

The US is tightening the screws on this unsatisfactory ally. So far as it goes, that is good. Senators Bob Corker and Ben Cardin have been calling for the US to go farther — to stop aid to Pakistan. But even that doesn't get to the heart of the matter. The US and Pakistan have had a long relationship, but the love has long since gone out of this bromance. Our interests are likely to diverge much more radically than at present as the US exit from Afghanistan draws closer.

Many of the most important details of the US-Pakistani relationship are only known by a handful of officials. That is inevitable when sensitive matters like counter-terrorism and nuclear weapons come into play. This means that outsiders are not going to get many of the vital nuances of one of the most delicate and difficult dances in the diplomatic world. But it does seem clear that the US now needs to muster all of its energy, resources and will for a strategic battle to determine the future parameters of our relations with Pakistan.

We are going to have to get tough. The Pakistani security establishment lives to a very large degree in what, to American eyes, looks like a dangerous and delusional imaginary world. As I've written before, Americans (and virtually everyone else in the world who looks at this question) sees Pakistan locked into a profoundly dysfunctional combination of misguided security ideas and comprehensive domestic failure. Pakistani strategists embrace these seemingly destructive policies out of some very deeply-held beliefs and in response to what they see as existential questions of national identity and cohesion. They will not be lightly diverted from this long-established and cherished course, however suicidal, and as is often the case with people whose goals are unrealistic, they are accustomed to very high risk strategies and brinkmanship. Defeat after defeat by India, progressive deterioration of the domestic security climate and the utter collapse of political morality in what passes for the governing class in Pakistan have not forced a reevaluation. Charm and appeals to sweet reason by American officials and emissaries won't do it either. Neither will humanitarian aid: the suffering of ordinary Pakistanis has little impact on the elite, and in the short to medium term public opinion in Pakistan is so anti-American and so politically marginal that we could die of old age waiting for spending however generous to change our image in Pakistan enough to change the politics of the relationship.

I favor generous and long term assistance to Pakistan as part of a long term relationship — assuming that the country is willing to stop running toward the abyss and to start moving, however slowly, in a more

promising direction. But we should not deceive ourselves that civilian aid buys much goodwill with what is, under a thin and increasingly unconvincing veneer of civilian rule, a military government on all security matters.

When it comes to changing Pakistani policy, aid however generous for schools and hospitals Pakistan's rulers don't care much about matters less than a credible threat that Pakistan could face an active US-led alliance from which it is excluded and which might even actively seek to frustrate its interests on key issues.

To get our relationship with Pakistan on the right track, the Obama administration is going to have to assemble and develop some serious threats. Sending the Seals to Abbottabad is a nice shot across the bow, but more will be needed. The administration is going to have to look at a broad range of options that stretch from adding some new dimensions to US-India relations and engaging more directly with more neighbors about the future of Afghanistan to additional operations like the Abbottabad raid where intelligence suggests appropriately important targets can be found. On the other hand, the administration needs to develop a crystal clear and specific vision for what we want from Pakistan and what we will do if and only if we can secure it.

This matters. The administration's ability to put its relationship with Pakistan on a clear path will go far to determine both the speed at which we are able to leave Afghanistan and the nature of the post-US situation there. More, what is at stake in both Afghanistan and Pakistan is still America's security at home. President Obama clearly understands that defending Americans from 9/11 style attacks remains the most important item on his job description. Getting Pakistan right is a must.

In this negotiation the Americans will do better if we have coordinated our approach with the Saudis — they, next to China, represent Pakistan's best hope of a replacement partner should the US alliance cool even further. The Saudis are widely believed to have helped support Pakistan's quest for what some call the 'Sunni bomb'; Pakistanis are ready and, if suitably paid, willing to support embattled Sunni Arab sheikhs against restive Shi'a subjects. From the Saudi point of view, Pakistan's 169 million people and nuclear arsenal look like reliable allies against Iran if US support should prove unreliable and one suspects that Pakistani contingency planning for a crisis with the US includes some assumptions about Saudi help.

The US needs to address this. The Obama administration can't make geography go away; the Saudis can and should have a relationship with Pakistan based on mutual interests and strategic need. But the Pakistan card goes up in value as the US card falls: the Obama administration needs to improve its relationship with the Saudis and clear up any misunderstandings about where we stand on the question of Saudi security. The Saudis may be religiously radical by some standards, but as long as they believe in the strength of the US umbrella they are conservative geopolitically. There are all kinds of reasons (including the restraining influence that Saudi money can have on radical clerics) to make sure the Saudis understand the depth of the American commitment to their survival.

We have another card to play, I suspect. Some of the information the Seals acquired in Abbottabad is likely to show that under Pakistani protection Bin Laden continued to plot and scheme against the Saudis. Pakistan has betrayed everyone, including the Saudis. Nobody likes this kind of behavior; Pakistan has

burned more than one bridge. The much feared and long delayed moment of truth in US-Pakistan relations is almost upon us. Nobody outside the government can really know all the important factors here, but the Obama administration is unlikely to develop a satisfactory relationship with Pakistan unless it is ready, willing and able to face a complete rupture. As long as Pakistan perceives that Washington is desperate to keep the relationship alive, it will play games.

Perhaps we truly have no choice; in that case the US must continue mashing on as best we may. But Pakistan is a weak and vulnerable state, wracked by internal dissension, ethnic rivalries and the guerrilla secessionist movement in Baluchistan. It is high time that the US began looking carefully at the alternatives to its alliance with Pakistan and taking some of the initial steps to ease what may be a necessary and inevitable transition to a new alignment in the region.

One hopes those steps would bring some badly needed sobriety to the strategic culture of Islamabad. This may well be our only hope now of changing Pakistan's behavior. In any case, basing our policy on comforting lies that we tell ourselves because we are too afraid to face bitter truths is not a good move. The promise to focus on Pakistan was one of the hallmarks of President Obama's 2008 campaign. The raid on Abbottabad shows he is still on the case. Every American should wish him and his team well as they prepare for even tougher choices ahead.

Reggie Sinha

[Back to top](#)

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2.

America's Finest Hour

Posted by: "Reggie Sinha" [REDACTED]
Mon May 9, 2011 6:21 pm (PDT)

P6/b(6)

My apologies for the disjointed thoughts, but I need help in ascertaining who knew, what, when for an article I am writing.

I think the GOTUS made a call and informed the GoP/PA immediately upon entering Pak sovereign space.

But it did not tell them about the intended target. Most likely, GOTUS said the flight was a routine Bagram to Tarbela flight consisting of four US choppers. PAF radar caught the signature, but Tabela Dam airport has U.S. assets and possibly did not raise any undue suspicions amongst the PA. After having reached Tarbela, the Americans did the unthinkable. The choppers continued to fly for the next 40 miles (64 kms.) NE straight towards Abbottabad.

The transit time for helos from Tarbela to Abbotabad must have been approx. 15-20 minutes (40 mile, 64 kms). This crucial time-segment was absolute brilliant in terms of throwing PA into a tizzy! They were caught off-guard, trying to make sense how the US choppers overshot its intended landing at Tarbela. However, press reports suggests that PAF had indeed scrambled (or at least knew something was amiss and had started to mobilize) their jets during this crucial 15-20 minute period. Press reports also

suggests that the PA had formed an inner cordon of Osama's compound almost at the time of commencement of the 40 minute raid by US navy seals.

Press reports suggest that the local police had started receiving numerous telephone calls starting at 12:30 a.m. local time on May 2nd and when they went to investigate, were asked by an already present PA to form an outer corridor. The date stamp on one newspaper is 1:31 a.m. dated May 2nd. The ops also began 12:30 a.m. local time. The local PA at best played a passive, logistical-support role in allowing the ops. to continue, something not easily acceptable, unless orders came from higher-up in the PA (it is like a local police station personnel allowing a bunch of hoodlums commit murder within their own jurisdiction, and to top it, throwing a protective cordon or two at the same time!). In these crucial 15-20 minutes and about the time US Navy Seals commenced ops, the PA/ISID knew that Osama was the target! This also means that within these 15-20 minutes, something extremely important happened for the PA/ISI to have sat totally immobilized. What happened? (recall, it was a cooperative US-Pak effort to capture Indonesian terrorist earlier! This time, the Americans were demanding Paks to sit out!). From a PAPOV, a very significant change in the rules of engagement. Who and why would Americans want to do a solo ops. Most likely, at this point, the PA/ISI realized the Pakgig was up!).

So what happened in this 15-20 minute timeframe? I think - and this is important - is that the GOTUS made a second, very important telephone call to GoP/PA. The GOTUS threatened Pakistan with the Samson option! Stay still, do nothing, otherwise face total annihilation of Pakistan!

If I were Obama, these are the thoughts going through my mind. Just look at my options. I have actionable intelligence, the elections are approaching; already the right-wing zealots have caused irreparable damage; the economy is not doing the best either; besides, I would never want to face a Carter-like Iran type hostage situation were Pakistanis captured and took navy seal personnel as hostages, only to be paraded day in out, inflaming passion in the muslim minds, with an unending demand of ransom ranging from demanding ransom. Each of my soldiers is coming back - dead or alive. I cannot, and must NEVER allow Pakistanis to take a live (or a dead) hostage. There is no chance of error. PA MUST play ball. They will ONLY do so if there is credible Samson option backed with ability to use it! Only then will, perhaps, PA/ISID comply. I have built my entire ops based on this premise. (Separately, this is where military historians will call this as America's finest hour and rate Obama's decision as one of the boldest Presidential decisions ever! In that, I salute my President!).

Consider again: After the 40 mts. ops. ended (and PAF/PA has been aware of at least 50-55 minutes), PAF STILL had sufficient time and reasons to counter-attack and down the American choppers carrying Osama and the treasure trove of information - so vital for Pakistan to cover its track - on its way back from Abbottabad to the Afghan border, a distance of approx. 120 miles (195 kms). They did not because they sat motionless dreading the Samson option. Not competence, but impotence! In order to implement the Samson option, the GOTUS must have activated, operationalized with a stand-by order USMIL Centcom, Paccom assets ranging from navy (Diego Garcia, Arabian Sea), to the USAF and US army from Afghanistan, Europe, USA.

Another thought which lead me to think that the GOTUS faked the Bagram-Tarbela-Abbottabad flight route was to provide minimum time for PA/ISI to sneak away Osama. Even if some reports were to be

believed that the PA clandestinely allowed Osama to be turned-in, they would at least have retrieved all of the computer hardware/software from the premises. That they were unable to do so suggests that they were completely taken by surprise and once having become aware, sat motionless unable to do anything but to reluctantly acquiesce to American demands.

Separately, did the GOTUS inform the GoI of the impending attack on Pakistan. I don't think so. The general predilection of a trigger-itchy PA is to attack India on the slightest pretext. Recall Zinni holding PA chief's hands at Isloo airport telling him it wasn't Indians attacking Pakistan, but US missiles flying over Pak on Talib tents. Which leads me to ponder. Given that Pakistan could attack India on a mistaken notion, are the Indians ready for, at best, a 10-15 minute lead-time when bombs start to drop in India. Scary indeed!

Please feel free to punch holes in the above thesis. TIA.

Reggie Sinha

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3.

CIA and ISI, once joined at the hip, now daggers drawn by Chidanand

Posted by: "n m" [REDACTED]
Mon May 9, 2011 6:27 pm (PDT)

P6/b(6)

CIA and ISI, once joined at the hip, now daggers drawn Chidanand Rajghatta, TNN | May 10, 2011, 12.22am IST

<http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/us/CIA-and-ISI-once-joined-at-the-hip-now-daggers-drawn/articleshow/8210899.cms>

WASHINGTON: The CIA

and ISI, respectively US and Pakistani intelligence agencies, which were once joined at the hip during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, are now torn apart from head to heart.

Ties between the two spook outfits have hit an all-time low after

Pakistani media outlets leaked the name of the CIA station chief in Islamabad for the second time this year, as reported by Times of India last weekend, even as the two sides wrangled over the Raymond Davis episode.

US officials said on Monday that they were not withdrawing their man in Islamabad as they did on the previous occasion when Pakistan

outed the previous Islamabad station chief Jonathan Banks. Pakistan maintained that the leaked name (purportedly a "Mark Carlton") of his replacement was not the correct moniker.

"If we were going to release the name, we would release the right one," an unnamed Pakistan official was quoted as saying. Some reports suggested the name was misspelt.

But the damage has been done. US analysts believe the Pakistani move is a shot across the US bow, since Washington had recently asked Islamabad for the names of all the operatives of the ISI's "S" division, which is said to handle ties with terrorist organization, and which the Obama administration, at the very least, believes may have been aware of bin Laden's hiding in Abbottabad.

Taken together with the Pakistani security establishment's persistent demand that Washington withdraw CIA personnel inside Pakistan, despite their stellar role in tracking down Osama bin Laden, the episode signals the end of the decades long fraternal dalliance between the two spy agencies that had its best moments during the Soviet presence in Afghanistan.

In those halcyon days, the CIA worked hand-in-glove with ISI (and the ISI, the joke went, worked hand-in-pocket with CIA), as the United States funneled billions of dollars to Pakistan in an effort to oust Soviet troops from Afghanistan. US lawmakers were conducted to the front-lines by the ISI where they posed for pictures with the Afghan mujaheddin - photos which adorned their Capitol Hill offices just before 9/11.

The suspicion in intelligence circles for the latest leak is focused on a senior Pakistani military official, Maj.Gen Athar Abbas, who is in charge of media relations in Islamabad. The alleged name of the CIA station chief was first broadcast on ARY television channel in which the military official's brother, Mazhar Abbas, is a news director. It was subsequently picked up by the right-wing newspaper, Nation, which is widely seen as a mouthpiece of the Pakistani security establishment.

The same newspaper also printed the name of the previous CIA station chief Jonathan Banks, necessitating his hurried withdrawal from Islamabad. On other occasions, the newspaper has also published the coordinates of US officials and personnel in Pakistan, which Washington sees as endangering their security at a highly volatile time in a country where anti-American sentiments are rampant.

According to intelligence sources, the breakdown in ties began after Pakistan's army chief Pervez Ashfaq Kiyani, began a review of the civilian government's policy of

acceding to US demand to station a large number of American security experts in Pakistan in the hunt for high-value al-Qaida targets. The US is said to have used the opening to also track other terrorists groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba, which were fostered by the ISI, a development that led to the flashpoint involving CIA contractor Raymond Davis.

The Pakistani security establishment is blaming President Zardari and his Washington mandarin Hussain Haqqani for giving visas to some 7000 US personnel. Haqqani has rejected the charges. "7000 figure is incorrect & official records prove hype on subject is totally fabricated. All procedures followed," Haqqani tweeted on Sunday amid growing tensions within the Pakistani government.

[Back to top](#)

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4.

HAL GOULD'S CORNER -- FACING THE TRUTH ABOUT PAKISTAN

Posted by: "Harold" [REDACTED]
Tue May 10, 2011 1:59 am (PDT)

P6/b(6)

DEAR ALL

MY LATEST TAKE ON THE MEANING OF THE RECENT EVENTS IN PAKISTAN AND SOUTH ASIA.

HAL GOULD

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The 'Missing Link' in US South Asia Policy: Facing the Truth About
Pakistan - Harold A. Gould

Monday, 09 May 2011 20:46

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"Those who cannot learn from history are condemned to repeat it."

<>

If ever there was a poetic affirmation of philosopher George Santayana's time-worn aphorism, it is the saga of U.S. policy toward Pakistan from its inception over sixty years ago until the death on May 2nd 2011 of Osama Bin Laden in Abbottabad, Pakistan. It is a judgement that cuts both ways, in fact. Neither Pakistan nor the United States ever learned from their past mistakes and the consequences are there for all to see: History has repeated itself not once but several times.. Reggie Sinha has recently summed it all up in a single crisp sentence: "When will the American leadership," he declared, "realize the true cost of (Pakistan's) double game?" But the plea can equally be made in the opposite direction: When will the American leadership face the fact that it was U.S. policies that put Pakistan in the position to play its double game?"

The events which led up to Abbottabad did not happen yesterday or a decade ago or even two decades ago. They have their roots and their origins in the American decision following World War II to bring the emerging Cold War to South Asia. This occurred on a systematic basis after the rise of John Foster Dulles as Secretary of State in 1956, with all he represented morally and politically (his Cold War-driven anti-Communist obsessions, his Episcopalian moral certitudes). He became the architect, under the rubric of the incoming Republican Eisenhower administration, of a United States policy that naively accommodated and enabled all of the political pathologies that were afflicting Pakistan from its inception at the time of Partition, and which facilitated the emergence of an "Islamic State" whose political culture was compounded of an archaic colonial administrative class, feudal landlords, increasingly strident Islamic ideologues, remnants of the Muslim League which had migrated from India (Muhajirs), and an ethnically predominant Punjabi military class determined to mold these diverse elements into an authoritarian state dedicated to the suppression of democracy and to waging a perpetual war of revenge against a hated "Hindu"-India.

By the 1950s, America entered the South Asia scene consumed by phobic anti-Communism and consequent Cold War strategic compulsions.(so-called "Containment") which took precedence over regional socio-historical considerations and specificities. There occurred a 'one-size-fits-all' strategic orientation which reduced all regional venues to a single militarized grand strategy. Pakistan was an ideal 'fit' for this orientation because it was controlled by a military class that was willing to be whatever U.S. cold warriors wanted them to be since their own ideological commitment to the Dulles version of anti-Communism was only skin deep. They would do and be whatever it took to acquire the

means to achieve their elemental goal - the conquest of India. Ayub Khan was indeed quoted to this effect!

This was a crucial distortion in the South Asian case because no credible basis for Soviet Bloc Communism ever existed there. The predominant South Asian state, India, under Nehru's political leadership and Mahatma Gandhi's inspirational tutelage, had opted for Westminster democracy, combined, with religious secularism, and a mixed Socialist and Capitalist economy. The country's military was fully subordinated to civilian authority and completely apolitical; extremist political groups both on the Right (Hindu and Muslim fundamentalists) and on the Left (Communists and Naxalites) were confined to the political fringe.

Although Pakistan, after Jinnah, steadily moved towards a socio-political system that eschewed liberal democracy, cultural pluralism and religious tolerance (the ingredients which assured India's political success), leading ultimately to a military-dominated state, it was never susceptible to dominance by or absorption into the Soviet sphere because its underlying Islamic cultural fabric was totally antithetical to Marxist-Leninist dialectical materialism.

It was, in fact, precisely this predilection which whetted the Dullesean appetite for a Cold War partner in South Asia: A state with formidable military potential combined with 'organic' anti-Communist credentials -- superficially: Cold warriors par excellence!

This happened not only because America's leaders were pathetically ignorant of the South Asia region's history, culture and emerging political realities at the point of their initial decision following World War II to become strategically involved in the region, but even more because they failed to learn from their initial mistakes as they went along. Instead they created a fantasy about the Pakistan of their strategic dreams (a stalwart anti-Communist bastion in South Asia) nurtured with billions of dollars worth of military and economic goodies regardless of abundant indications that the real Pakistan was a deeply troubled state incapable of living up to the cold warriors' aspirations for it. President Eisenhower himself testified to this in a National Security Council meeting.

Fortunately for both parties, but not for the future of South Asia, America's global strategic fantasies mutually reinforced the Pakistani elite's political fantasies. It allowed their leaders to delude themselves into believing that feigning anti-Communism in order to join America's anti-Communist crusade would win for them a de facto military

alliance with the U.S. which would afford them the military, economic and diplomatic resources they sought, not to defend South Asia against Soviet Bloc imperialism, but to enable them to wage war against India.

It can be said that General Ayub Khan built his domestic political credibility upon this fantasy. It came crashing down in 1965 when America stood by and allowed Pakistan's quixotic invasion of India to fail, thereby making it clear that America's support of Pakistan after all was limited to American interests alone. This scenario was repeated in the 1971 Bangladesh war and again at Kargil.

The bitterness flowing from the intrusion of reality into the Pakistani leadership's paranoid delusions persists to this day and accounts for their inability to resolve the political pathologies which have made them the international clearing house for Islamic terrorism, and hosts to murderous fanatics like the late Osama bin Laden, Mullah Omar, Aiman Zawahiri, Lashkar e Taiba, etc., instead of healthy participants in the global economy like its hated neighbor, India.

America's culpability in the current condition of the Pakistani state arises from one simple fact: The disastrous decision back in the 1950s to recruit Pakistan into the Cold War which set off a chain reaction of militarism, corruption and flirtation with Islamic extremism; it led inexorably through four periods of military dictatorship (Ayub, Yahya, Zia and Musharraf), through weak and truncated attempts to establish viable civil society, massive corruption, sporadic economic development, epidemic political duplicity towards its principal benefactor (the United States), debilitating dalliances with politically diseased Muslim fanatics like Osama bin Laden and Mullah Omar, an array of extremist Islamic organizations like Lashkar, and appallingly ignorant and childish acts of anti-Indian terrorism like Mumbai, and upon the Indian parliament.

Thus far, American policy-makers remain oblivious and naive about what a half-century of shallow diplomacy and disheartening permissiveness toward the Pakistani military class has led to, and continues to lead to. With no firm controls over the billions upon billions in economic aid to Pakistan, most of which has been consistently coopted by the military and funneled into the pursuit of their anti-India bugaboos and nuclear weapons development, civil society itself has been starved and emasculated. As long as this continues, Pakistan will remain a politically ineffectual, morally challenged, terrorist-breeding, politically marginal state that is a danger to itself, to the South Asian region, and indeed to the world.

Last Updated on Monday, 09 May 2011 20:56
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5.

It's smart diplomacy by Rohit Viswanath

Posted by: "n m" [REDACTED]
Tue May 10, 2011 2:16 am (PDT)

P6/b(6)

It's smart diplomacyRohit Viswanath | May 10, 2011, 12:00am IST

<http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/opinion/edit-page/Its-smart-diplomacy/articleshow/8208771.cms>

India's recent decision

against shortlisting American fighter jets in the medium multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA) competition has been interpreted in many ways in different quarters. Many feel had India decided upon American-made jets, the choice would have furthered US-India military ties and manufacturing collaboration. Touted as the world's biggest international military aircraft deal in two decades, the nearly \$12 billion deal being equal to over half of US exports to India last year, it would have taken bilateral trade between the two to a much higher platform. Rumour mills even have it that former US ambassador to India, Timothy Roemer, resigned because the deal did not get through.

Some observers have gone further. They claim the choice to be an affront on America's call for closer strategic partnership. This section has again begun viewing India with suspicion and through the prism of "non-alignment". They cite India's recent abstention on UNSC Resolution 1973 on Libya, its reluctance to cooperate on Iran and Myanmar

and also its attempts at creating a new power bloc of BRICS nations as evidence of its commitment to the long-deceased policy. For them, the deal was a litmus test of American success in subverting India's independent foreign policy through carrots-like acceptance of India as a de facto nuclear power by virtue of the India-US nuclear deal as also the offer of a UNSC permanent membership.

They are unhappy

because they thought the deal's success would have furthered India's and America's shared interest in containing China. While Pakistan remains a constant worry, India is also increasingly concerned by the strategic challenge posed by China. Its approval of the American bids, according to them, would have boosted joint capabilities in warfare. This they claim would serve as a deterrent to potential Chinese hostility on the subcontinent and in the Indian Ocean and also help train the armed forces to fight alongside one another should deterrence fail.

On the other hand, people elated at Indian rejection of the American bid cite the unreliability of American supply as the greatest hitch. According to them, the US is not trustworthy: it has been known to stop supply of parts if the buyer does not adhere to American whims and fancies.

The other reasons include excessive restrictions placed on users and the end-user monitoring on the aircraft, which undermine sovereignty and make the Indian establishment uncomfortable. Further, the Indian government has recently mandated that foreign contractors invest a certain percentage of the deal for indigenous production. It envisions the deal will go beyond just procurement of 126 jets and help modernise India's aerospace industry. American firms are said to have a history of being unwilling to honour this agreement. The US has in place stringent export control regimes that prevent American companies from transferring technology and outsourcing manufacturing of strategic equipment. Moreover, America's move to sell the exorbitantly priced jets to India is seen as an extension of its ongoing beggar-thy-neighbour policy to offset its ailing domestic economy.

Bracketing India's decision within either of the above analyses is myopic. There may have been political calculations involved, but the choice was largely determined by technical considerations. Six aircraft were bid for the order - the Swedish Saab Gripen, Eurofighter Typhoon, French Dassault Rafale, Russian Mikoyan MiG-35 and the American F-16IN and F/A-18IN Super Hornet. Mikoyan and Dassault have been regular suppliers of aircraft for the Indian Air Force (IAF) in the past.

The IAF shortlisted

Rafale and Typhoon only after putting them through an intense schedule

of technical evaluations lasting over several months. The factors that appear to have favoured them are clearly the offer of an equal partnership between the vendor and the buyer, perceptible technology transfer, existing industrial linkages and, most importantly, superior performance of the jets which also conformed to most of the 643 laid down technical parameters. IAF pilots and technicians are already familiar with the earlier aircraft from those two aircraft manufacturers, and hence would need minimal retraining. Infrastructural and logistical support for maintenance and spares would also be easier for these aircraft. To alter those to suit new American jets would not only involve further complexities but also expand the already allocated mammoth budget.

There is no doubt that the contract represented a prime opportunity for US companies to gain a foothold in the Indian defence market, estimated to be about \$100 billion in the next 10 years. But surely India-US relations go much beyond a few chunks of military and aeronautical hardware. The Indian decision, hence, was certainly not intended to snub America.

With a complex global cold war for control over resources and markets already in sight, the political calculations behind the MMRCA decision must be inferred in this context. India perceives itself to be one of the poles in a multipolar world and next only to the US and China. The country's policy pundits are aware that in the face of an increasingly aggressive and affluent China, India needs to ensure that Europe, with its economy in doldrums right now, remains in its sphere of influence. Europe matters not just as a strategic partner but also because of its advanced technological prowess. The deal is clearly an attempt by India to woo the Europeans and ensure their continued support for New Delhi's positions on critical international issues.

The MMRCA conclusion is not an expression of India's limitations or shifting strategic inclinations. It just reflects smart diplomacy.

The writer is a project associate with ICRIER.

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6.

26/11 attack is as important to US as 9/11: Timothy Roemer

Posted by: "n m" [REDACTED]
Tue May 10, 2011 2:16 am (PDT)

P6/b(6)

26/11 attack is as important to US as 9/11: Timothy Roemer

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Posted: Tue May 10 2011, 12:57 hrs

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Ambassador to India Timothy J Roemer today asserted that America was not adopting double standards while dealing with 26/11 and 9/11, and said that both countries have come closer since the attacks.

"I respectfully and strongly disagree with you," Roemer told reporters at the Gandhi Ashram here while answering a query on whether the US was adopting double standards on the issue.

"From 9/11 where we lost 3,000 people, about 42 Indians, to 26/11 where scores of Indians were slaughtered by terrorists, including six Americans who died on that day, America and India especially over the past two years have come together to share intelligence, in unprecedented ways," Roemer, who is on a day's visit to the city, said here.

"US also shared David Headley and intelligence information related to him with agencies in India. We are working under directions of United States and India to help build capacity here in India, build forensic capabilities, the possibility of new national counter-terrorism centre, share best practices and expertise, as to how to prevent the next terrorist attack," Roemer, who has recently resigned from the key diplomatic post, and is scheduled to leave the country in June, said.

He further said the US, through FBI also helped India in getting Ajmal Kasab convicted for the Mumbai

attacks.

"I think the two countries have come together. They have also come together in so many other ways, like green partnerships, helping to addressing poverty, Afghanistan, on providing food stuff to Africa. US President also pledged his support for UN security Council seat for India," Roemer said.

"This partnership continues to get closer and closer. It has a historic trajectory of global partnership to bring these countries closer in the future too," he added.

On Pakistan, Roemer said the US has been putting a great deal of pressure on Pakistan to go after safe havens in that country to target the al-Qaeda leadership and other terrorist groups that might threaten Afghanistan, Pakistan, India and the US homelands.

"Individuals from the US government at the highest levels have been telling the government of Pakistan that you are a good partner, you are concentrating more on extremism, in your country, but you need to do more. You (Pakistan) need to not only target al-Qaeda, but also target Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT)," Roemer said.

The outgoing envoy said that the US in the last few weeks has decided to indict four more individuals with regard to the Headly case, who is an accused in 26/11 Mumbai attacks and a case is going on against him in the US.

"(To Know that) One of those men had connections and support from a certain organisation in Pakistan gives us great concern," he added, without taking name of one Major Iqbal who was among the four reportedly charge sheeted by the US government in connection with the Headley case.

"You can see from those indictments and other activities that the targets that US and India share in terms of LeT and individuals being indicted, are more and more common," Roemer said.

On sharing intelligence with India, the US Ambassador said the commonalities and goals with regard to world security and intelligence sharing were very close between the US and India.

"I believe there is very healthy, good, vibrant day to day, hour to hour and minute to minute intelligence sharing with the government of India. This occurred both prior to 26/11 and post the event," he said.

He said the sharing of intelligence has been taking place during the time of the Common Wealth Games, President Obama's visit to India and during the ICC Cricket World Cup.

"This shows shoulder to shoulder cooperation between the two countries. This cooperation needs to go both ways. This partnership is strong, global in nature, and security partnership between the two

countries on intelligence post 26/11 is extraordinarily strong," Roemer said.

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