

Sent: Mon, 23 May 2011 05:47:18 -0400 P3/b(3)
From: [REDACTED]
To: "Johnson, David" <davidj@rand.org>, "Lacey, James G" <jlacey@ida.org>, "Kurtz, James H" <jkurtz@ida.org>, Mark Schneider [REDACTED]
Subject: Viewpoint: South Korea should follow U.S. example (SOF) P6/b(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: David Maxwell [REDACTED]
Sent: Friday, May 20, 2011 6:29 PM
To: David Maxwell
Subject: FW: [Viewpoint] Korea should follow U.S. example (SOF)

Although I am loathe to advise or assist any foreign military to be created in our image, we have in fact recommended over the years that Korea established a Joint Special Operations Command - not in the mold of JSOC as described below but with similar capabilities and responsibilities as USSOCOM. This is primarily a resource and interoperability issue for the Koreans.

Korean SOF is dominated by the Army and the Korean Army Special Warfare Command has about 600 Special Forces A Teams. It is no organic airlift. The ROK Navy has a small SEAL element (that has in fact conducted at least two successful counter-piracy operations rescuing hostages afloat off the Somali coast). There is no real Special Operations air element though the ROK Air Force has always had 4 X C-130s designated to support SOF, but they are not capable of penetrating high threat air space so they are used for intra-theater movement of Special Warfare Command teams. There are Ranger units but they are assigned to Corps and Armies not to the Special Warfare Command.

During wartime the ROK Army Special Warfare Command does receive OPCON of the ROK Navy SEALs and the 4 X C-130s so it does become kind of a joint SOF Command. But it is not resourced and does not train sufficiently in Armistice to be an effective joint SOF organization.

The ROK Army did procure some 24 Blackhawks for SOF use but only for use during Armistice for counter-SOF missions within the ROK and these have always remain elusive for support the Special Warfare Command and they are not available for wartime support (but like the C-130s they are not advanced penetration platforms). SOF in Korea is supported much like US SOF was prior to the Nunn Cohen amendment of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act in 1987. It is somewhat ironic since the ROK has had two Presidents who were SF commanders (though they later went to jail!) and many senior ROK Army leaders have served in SF – example is GEN(RET) Baek Gun Ki went on to command the Third ROK Army (TROKA), the premier ROK Army Command after commanding the ROK Army Special Warfare Command.

But Korean SOF has no advocate and has no significant influence within the ROK military. Some would say that this is deliberate as they do not want SOF

to gain too much power and influence and some say it is a result of how the Kwangju uprising was handled with ROK SF.

But the fact remains that ROK SOF needs to be adequately resourced. We (particularly US SOF counterparts but also UNC/CFC commanders and their staffs) have advocated for proper resourcing for years. Just getting them advanced satellite communications was a huge effort back in 2004-2005 that required intervention and support from the UNC/CFC Commander. ROK SOF (and the ROK military and the Nation) would benefit from a SOCOM like organization that integrates all SOF and advocates for proper resourcing.

Note the author concludes that it is the National Assembly that holds all the cards. Perhaps a common SOF characteristic is that SOF can never be successful without backing from a National Legislature!!

[Viewpoint] Korea should follow U.S. example
Korea's situation is extremely lamentable. The lessons from the Cheonan sinking are all forgotten.
May 21, 2011

The chain of command for the U.S. operation to kill Osama bin Laden is a bit of a mystery. Central Intelligence Agency chief Leon Panetta commanded the elite unit. Vice Adm. William McRaven, commander of the Joint Special Operations Command, was under Panetta's command in control of the Navy Seals in question. Meanwhile, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates was not part of the chain of command for Operation Neptune Spear. Gates was shown in a photo of the White House situation room during the operation, standing with folded arms. Gates is the second highest in the military chain of command, next to U.S. President Barack Obama.

At the same time, Panetta controlled the situation from CIA headquarters. That's why he was not a part of the historic photograph.

The whole situation was like Korea's operation against Somali pirates early this year. National Intelligence Service Chief Won Sei-hoon commanded the Navy's operation, not Defense Minister Kim Kwan-jin.

The situation was completely different from what happened shortly before the U.S. attacks on Afghanistan in 2001. At the time, the Pentagon, under Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, and the CIA, under George Tenet, argued over the first special operation. Who are soldiers and who are spies?

In the war on terror, the boundary between the Pentagon and CIA disappeared. Since the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, joint cooperation in the United States has evolved. It is a security system in which the president can assign the control-command authority of a military operation to an intelligence chief, not the defense secretary. The United States has changed. That's the power of America.

The Sept. 11 attacks were a failure of intelligence. There were many signs of an imminent attack, but the CIA failed to link them. Three months before the attacks, the CIA submitted a daily briefing memo to the president titled "Bin

Laden determined to attack inside the United States.”

But a grand failure followed. Misjudgments were made about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. That was the justification for the U.S. war against Iraq in 2003. The CIA linked a few indications and drew a clear line of information. There was not a “slam dunk” as expressed by Tenet.

Under the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, passed by the U.S. Congress in 2004, the CIA was put under the director of national intelligence's control. The walls between intelligence agencies were lowered. The starting point of Operation Neptune Spear was the CIA's interrogations of Sept. 11 terror suspects. In 2004, they got the alias of Osama bin Laden's courier. Three years later, the courier's real name was uncovered. The CIA located Bin Laden's Pakistan compound last October by following the courier's movements. The National Security Agency's cellphone wiretapping played a critical role. A spy satellite pinpointed the license plate of the courier.

A 24-hour monitoring system was established. The CIA created a safe house near Bin Laden's compound and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency analyzed the hiding place. It was no doubt remarkable to see the intelligence offices weave a wide net of information together.

“In my nearly 50 years in intelligence, never have I seen a more remarkable example of focused integration, seamless collaboration,” said Director of National Intelligence James Clapper.

The unprecedented integration and collaboration were also demonstrated on the military side. The Joint Special Operations Command was the outcome of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act, aimed at improving the joint operation of U.S. forces. It was created after the catastrophic failure of the Iran hostage rescue mission in 1980. The mission failed because of a lack of an integrated command and control system for the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps and Special Forces.

The Navy Seal unit that performed the operation was under the Joint Special Operations Command. The Army's Delta Force and the Air Force's 24th Special Tactics Squadron are also under the joint command. It is an integrated field command for the Army, Navy and Air Force's special operation forces.

The flexible system, reform through the Congress and spirit to learn from failures combine to form an intelligence DNA that has built today's United States.

In comparison, Korea's situation is extremely lamentable. The lessons from the Cheonan sinking are all forgotten.

Although “jointness” was stressed repeatedly, the Army, Navy and Air Force have all gone back to selfishness. Defense reform is not a theological debate. The military is too oblivious.

The National Assembly is holding all the cards. Bills governing defense reform will soon be submitted to the National Assembly and the legislature must go beyond the interests of the three forces for national interest.

*The writer is an editor of foreign and security affairs at the JoongAng Ilbo.

By Oh Young-hwan

<http://joongangdaily.joins.com/article/view.asp?aid=2936473>

--

David S. Maxwell
COL, US Army
National War College, Bldg 61 (Roosevelt Hall), Rm 136B
Fort McNair, Washington, DC 20319
Office (202) 685-2309 (DSN 325)
Official email: david.maxwell@ndu.edu



P3/b(3)
P6/b(6)

"It is important that the adversary think you know more about him than you really do." William T. Sherman